



Chapter 9

Medium Access

- ❑ Point-to-Point Connections
 - ❑ Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)
 - ❑ Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP)
- ❑ Multi-Access Networks
 - ❑ IEEE 802.1x

Scope of Link Layer Security Protocols



- ❑ According to the classical understanding of the OSI model, the link layer provides an assured data transmission service *between two peer entities that are directly inter-connected by a communications medium*
- ❑ Its main tasks are:
 - ❑ Error detection and correction
 - ❑ Medium access control (MAC, not to be mixed up with message authentication code) for shared media, e.g. Ethernet, etc.
- ❑ Not all of today's networking technology fits nicely into that model:
 - ❑ Dial-up connections to an Internet service provider
 - ❑ Virtual Private Network (VPN) solutions
- ❑ In this class, we content ourselves with the following definition:
 - ❑ The purpose of a link layer security protocol is to ensure specific security properties of link layer PDUs, that is the PDUs of the protocol layer carrying the PDUs of the network layer (e.g. IP)




Point-to-Point Connections

Point-to-Point Protocol: Purpose and Tasks




- ❑ Large parts of the Internet rely on point-to-point connections:
 - ❑ Wide area network (WAN) connections between routers
 - ❑ Dial-up connections of hosts using modems and telephone lines
- ❑ Protocols for this purpose:
 - ❑ Serial Line IP (SLIP): no error detection, supports only IP, no dynamic address assignment, no authentication [RFC 1055]
 - ❑ Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP): successor to SLIP, supports IP, IPX, ...




- ❑ PPP [RFC 1661/1662]:
 - ❑ Layer-2 frame format with frame delimitation and error detection
 - ❑ Control protocol (*Link Control Protocol, LCP*) for connection establishment, -test, -negotiation, and -release
 - ❑ Separate *Network Control Protocols (NCP)* for supported Layer-3 protocols

Point-to-Point Protocol: Security Services




- ❑ The original version of PPP [RFC 1661] suggests the optional run of an authentication protocol after the link establishment phase:
 - ❑ If required, authentication is demanded by one peer entity via an LCP Configuration-Request at the end of the link establishment phase
 - ❑ Originally, two authentication protocols have been defined:
 - *Password Authentication Protocol (PAP)*
 - *Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)*
 - ❑ Meanwhile, an extensible protocol has been defined:
 - *Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)*
 - *PPP EAP Transport Level Security Protocol (PPP-EAP-TLS)*
- ❑ Furthermore, encryption can be negotiated after authentication:
 - ❑ Protocols:
 - *Encryption Control Protocol (ECP)* for negotiation
 - *PPP DES Encryption Protocol (DESE)*
 - *PPP Triple DES Encryption Protocol (3DESE)*

Point-to-Point Protocol: Authentication Protocols



- ❑ Password Authentication Protocol (PAP):
 - ❑ PAP was defined 1992 in RFC 1334
 - ❑ The protocol is very simple:
 - Prerequisite: the authenticator knows a password of the peer entity
 - At the end of the link establishment phase one entity, called authenticator, demands the peer entity to authenticate with PAP
 - The peer entity sends an *authenticate-request* message containing its' *peer ID* and *password*
 - The authenticator checks if the provided information is correct and answers with either an *authenticate-ack* or an *authenticate-nack*
 - ❑ As the protocol provides no cryptographic protection, it is insecure
 - ❑ PAP is not mentioned in updated RFCs for PPP authentication [RFC1994]

Point-to-Point Protocol: Authentication Protocols



- ❑ Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP):
 - ❑ CHAP is also defined in RFC 1334 and RFC 1994
 - ❑ It realizes a simple challenge-response protocol:
 - Prerequisite: authenticator and peer entity share a secret
 - After the link establishment phase the authenticator (A) sends a challenge message containing an *identifier* for this challenge, a random number r_A , and its name to the peer entity (B):
 $A \rightarrow B: (1, \text{identifier}, r_A, A)$
 - The peer entity computes a cryptographic hash function over its name, the shared secret $K_{A,B}$ and the challenge random number r_A and sends the following message:
 $B \rightarrow A: (2, \text{identifier}, H(B, K_{A,B}, r_A), B)$
 - Upon reception of this message the authenticator re-computes the hash value and compares it with the received one; if both values match it answers with a *success* message
 - RFC 1994 specifies, that MD5 must be supported as hash function, but use of other hash functions can be negotiated

Point-to-Point Protocol: Authentication Protocols



- ❑ Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP):
 - ❑ EAP is an general protocol for PPP authentication which supports multiple authentication methods [RFC2284]
 - ❑ The main idea behind EAP is to provide a common protocol to run more elaborate authentication methods than “1 question + 1 answer”
 - ❑ The protocol provides basic primitives:
 - Request, Response: further refined by type field + type specific data
 - Success, Failure: to indicate the result of an authentication exchange
 - ❑ Type fields:
 - Identity
 - Notify
 - Nak (response only, to answer unacceptable request types)
 - MD5 Challenge (this corresponds to CHAP)
 - One-Time Password (OTP): defined in [RFC2289]
 - Generic Token Card
 - EAP-TLS



❑ One-Time Password (OTP):

❑ The basic idea of OTP is to transmit a “password”, that can only be used for one run of an authentication dialogue

❑ Initial Setup:

■ The authenticator A sends a seed value r_A and the peer entity B concatenates it with his password and computes a hash value:

$$PW_N = H^N(r_A, password_B)$$

■ The pair (N, PW_N) is “securely” transmitted to the authenticator and stored at the authenticator

❑ Authentication dialogue:

■ $A \rightarrow B: N - 1$

■ $B \rightarrow A: PW_{N-1} := H^{N-1}(r_A, password_B)$


■ A checks if $H(PW_{N-1}) = PW_N$, and stores $(N - 1, PW_{N-1})$ as the new authentication information for B

❑ Security: In order to break this scheme, an attacker would have to eavesdrop one PW_N and compute $H^{-1}(PW_N)$ which is impractical


Point to Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP)



- ❑ PPP was originally designed to be run between “directly” connected entities, that is entities which share a layer-2 connection
 - ❑ Example: a PC and a dialup-router of an Internet service provider connected over the telephone network using modems
- ❑ The basic idea of PPTP is to extend the protocol’s reach over the entire Internet by defining transport of PPP PDUs in IP packets
 - ❑ Thus, the payload of PPTP PDUs are PPP packets (without layer-2 specific fields like HDLC flags, bit insertion, control characters, CRC error check values, etc.)
 - ❑ PPP packets are encapsulated in GRE packets (generic routing encapsulation) that themselves are encapsulated in IP packets:








PPTP: Voluntary vs. Compulsory Tunneling






- ❑ PPTP realizes a “tunnel” over the Internet that carries PPP packets
- ❑ Such a tunnel can be realized between different entities:
 - ❑ A client PC and a PPTP Remote Access Server (RAS):
 - This is also referred to as *voluntary tunneling*, as the client PC is actively participating in the PPTP processing
 - This variant allows to support secure communication between a client PC and a specific subnetwork using any access and intermediate network(s)
 - ❑ An ISP’s Point of Presence (POP) and a PPTP Remote Access Server:
 - This is also referred to as *compulsory tunneling*, as the client PC is not involved in the decision whether PPTP will be used or not
 - This allows to realize security on the subnetwork level but does not realize true end-to-end security between the client PC and the RAS
 - In compulsory tunneling the ISP POP acts as a proxy client to the RAS


PPTP: Voluntary Tunneling Protocol Layers



PPTP: Compulsory Tunneling Protocol Layers



PPTP: Voluntary Tunneling Packet Construction at Client






Multi-Access Networks

IEEE 802.1x: Background & Goals



- ❑ The *Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802 LAN/MAN Standards Committee* develops local area network standards and metropolitan area network standards
- ❑ The most widely used standards are:
 - ❑ Ethernet family (802.3, generally referred to as CSMA/CD),
 - ❑ Token Ring (802.5),
 - ❑ Wireless LAN (802.11)
- ❑ The IEEE committee is currently working on a standard that:
 - ❑ aims to *“restrict access to the services offered by a LAN to those users and devices that are permitted to make use of those services”*
 - ❑ may be used with different IEEE 802.x technologies
 - ❑ defines port based network access control to provide a means of *“authenticating and authorizing devices attached to a LAN port that has point-to-point connection characteristics”*
 - ❑ is generally referred to as *IEEE 802.1x*

IEEE 802.1x: Controlled and Uncontrolled Ports



- ❑ IEEE 802.1x introduces the notion of two logical ports:
 - ❑ the uncontrolled port allows to authenticate a device
 - ❑ the controlled port allows an authenticated device to access LAN services




- ❑ Three principal roles are distinguished:
 - ❑ A device that wants to use the service offered by an IEEE 802.1x LAN acts as a *supplicant* requesting access to the controlled port
 - ❑ The point of attachment to the LAN infrastructure (e.g. a MAC bridge) acts as the *authenticator* demanding the supplicant to authenticate itself
 - ❑ The authenticator does not check the credentials presented by the supplicant itself, but passes them to his *authentication server* for verification
- ❑ Accessing a LAN with IEEE 802.1x security measures:
 - ❑ Prior to successful authentication the supplicant can access the uncontrolled port:
 - The port is uncontrolled in the sense, that it allows access prior to authentication
 - However, this port allows only restricted access
 - ❑ Authentication can be initiated by the supplicant or the authenticator
 - ❑ After successful authentication the controlled port is opened

IEEE 802.1x Security Protocols & Message Exchange



- ❑ IEEE 802.1x does not define its own security protocols, but advocates the use of existing protocols:
 - ❑ The *Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)* may realize basic device authentication [RFC 2284]
 - ❑ If negotiation of a session key during authentication is required, the use of the *PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol* is recommended [RFC 2716]
 - ❑ Furthermore, the authentication server is recommended to be realized with the *Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)* [RFC 2865]
- ❑ Exchange of EAP messages between supplicant and authenticator is realized the with the *EAP over LANs (EAPOL)* protocol:
 - ❑ EAPOL defines the encapsulation techniques that shall be used in order to carry EAP packets between supplicant port access entities (PAE) and Authenticator PAEs in a LAN environment
 - ❑ EAPOL frame formats have been defined for various members of the 802.x protocol family, e.g. EAPOL for Ethernet, ...
 - ❑ Between supplicant and authenticator RADIUS messages may be used

IEEE 802.1x: Example of an 802.1x Authentication



[source: IEEE Draft P802.1X/D11]

Summary (what do I need to know)




- ❑ Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)
 - ❑ Authentication via PAP, CHAP, EAP, OTP

- ❑ Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP)
 - ❑ Principles of layer-2-tunelling

- ❑ IEEE 802.1x
 - ❑ Principles and operation
 - ❑ EAP authentication

Additional References



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